Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations
Safety Oversight
Safety Oversight
CTA Internal Oversight Failures
33 Track Inspection Teams 5 Roadmasters • Oversee Inspection/Maintenance Teams • Conduct monthly track inspection
• Dearborn Subway – accomplished
only 1 in 5 months • Many inspection records found incomplete/missing
CTA Internal Oversight Failures
Track Engineer IV Maintenance
• Oversees Roadmasters
Manager of Track • Oversees Track Engineer IV Maintenance, and maintenance and construction groups
Vice President Engineering & Staff
• Oversees Manager of Track
CTA Internal Oversight Failures
System Safety Department
• Monitor departmental functions listed in
the System Safety Program Plan
• No technical expertise or knowledge of
track systems
• Primarily concentrated on walkway areas
in tunnels and emergency exits
State Safety Oversight
1991 NTSB, Oversight of Rail Rapid Transit Safety
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 FTA requires each State with a fixedguideway system to designate an oversight agency to conduct safety and security oversight
State Safety Oversight
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requires each rail transit agency to address operating and maintenance rules and procedures
Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) requires CTA to have a System Safety Program Plan
RTA Safety Oversight Program
• RTA’s main responsibilities are financial
oversight and regional planning
• Only two RTA staff assigned part-time to
CTA Oversight Program
RTA Safety Oversight Program
• Review major accidents • Conduct on-site triennial reviews • File reports to FTA • Approve annual internal CTA audits • Review hazard management, safety
certification, and corrective action plans
RTA Safety Oversight Program
RTA Triennial Review in August 2004
Final report released January 2005
RTA Safety Oversight Program
RTA’s 2005 report of CTA included information regarding problems with
Track fasteners
Wide gage
Gage restraint rods Track inspection personnel at lean levels Inconsistent on-the-job training
RTA Safety Oversight Program
• RTA failed to follow up on comments or
observations in the Triennial report
• Comments and observations contained
track safety deficiencies
Draft Conclusion
Because the Regional Transportation Authority failed to follow up with the Chicago Transit Authority and prompt action to correct safety deficiencies identified in the triennial report, unsafe track conditions continued to exist that should have been corrected.
Federal Transit Administration
• FTA has not audited RTA since 2000 • September 11, 2001: FTA ceased its
audits of State safety oversight agencies
• 2005 – FTA resumed its audit program
and expects to review all State oversight agencies by September 2009
• FTA to audit RTA in Spring of 2008
Federal Transit Administration
• Improving Compliance with Operating and
Maintenance Rules
• May 8, 2007, FTA letter to heavy rail and
commuter rail agencies
• Partnership with APTA • Develop a track inspection training course
Federal Transit Administration
2006 GAO Report on FTA State Safety Oversight GAO report determined:
- Lacked information to track program trends
- State Safety agencies do not have enough
qualified staff - Need for additional training
Draft Conclusion
The Federal Transit Administration’s oversight of the Regional Transportation Authority’s Rail Safety Oversight Program was inadequate and failed to prompt actions needed to correct track safety deficiencies on the Chicago Transit Authority’s rail transit system.